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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                            Appellee,
v.
LISA REED,
                                                            Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No.  06-cr-00124)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 29, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 29, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Lisa Reed appeals her judgment of sentence, claiming that her guilty plea was
invalid.  We will affirm.
I.
As we write for the parties, we summarize only the essential facts.
In April 2005, Reed and Glenny Coleman, III—using the fictitious name “Eugene
Adams” and a false social security number—applied for a car loan from Univest National
Bank & Trust Company.  In reliance upon the false information, Univest made a car loan
of $38,339, which Reed and Coleman used to purchase a 2002 Cadillac Escalade from
Paul Burns Auto Center in Langhorne, Pennsylvania.  Reed then obtained insurance for
the car in her name and in the name of Eugene Adams.  Reed attempted to make only one
car payment, but was unsuccessful in doing so because she used a fraudulent check.
Following her indictment on eleven counts, Reed pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One) and aiding and abetting
aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A and 2 (Count Two).  The
District Court sentenced Reed to 45 months imprisonment, which was comprised of a
bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence of 21 months incarceration at Count One and a
mandatory consecutive sentence of 24 months incarceration at Count Two.
On appeal, Reed principally claims that her guilty plea was invalid because it
lacked sufficient factual basis.  Reed also argues that she neither read nor saw the plea
3agreement prior to the plea hearing, and that her counsel led her to believe that if she
pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a 2002 Escalade, all other charges would be dropped
and she would not be incarcerated.  Although Reed admits that she accompanied Coleman
to the Paul Burns Auto Center and knew that Coleman obtained a Cadillac Escalade by
using a pseudonym and a false social security number, she now claims she was unaware
of any relevant conduct attributed to her in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). 
Because Reed failed to object to the PSR, we review for plain error.  See United States v. 
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 196 (3d Cir. 2007).
II.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—which prescribes the manner
in which a guilty plea is to be entered—requires a district court to advise the defendant of
her right to trial and ascertain that she is entering into a guilty plea knowingly and
voluntarily.  Moreover, “the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the
plea.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).   Here, the record demonstrates that the District Court
carefully adhered to the requirements of Rule 11 in accepting Reed’s guilty plea.
At the plea hearing, the District Court informed Reed of her right to a trial, and
asked a series of questions to ensure that her plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 
Once Reed was deemed competent, she attested that she received and read her indictment
and discussed the case with her counsel.
4Although she neither saw nor read the plea agreement prior to the day of her
hearing, Reed testified that she read it that day and had the opportunity to discuss it with
her counsel prior to signing the document.  Reed said that she understood how the
Sentencing Guidelines worked, and understood that neither the Guidelines nor the signed
plea agreement was binding on the District Court, which remained free to impose a more
severe sentence than what she and her counsel may have anticipated.
The District Court then described the maximum penalties for Counts One and Two
and described the elements that the Government would have to prove at trial if Reed
decided to withdraw her guilty plea.  Reed acknowledged that she and Coleman
purchased a 2002 Cadillac Escalade with the false name of Eugene Adams, a false social
security number, and $38,000 she had obtained by providing false information to Univest
National Bank & Trust Company.  The Government presented its summary of the same
events, and Reed accepted the Government’s summary without objection or amendment. 
Reed then pleaded guilty to both counts.
Based on the information presented at the hearing, there are sufficient facts to
support Reed’s guilty plea as to both counts of the Indictment.  The conduct described in
the record is adequate to establish the elements of conspiracy to commit bank fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, which requires that: (1) two or more persons agreed to
commit bank fraud; (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined in the conspiracy;
5and (3) a member of the conspiracy performed an overt act for the purpose of advancing
the conspiracy.
The facts of record also suffice to establish the elements of aiding and abetting
aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, which requires:  (1) a person
knowingly used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person; (2)
the person used the means of identification during and in relation to certain enumerated
crimes (here, the conspiracy to commit bank fraud); (3) the defendant knew that the crime
was being committed; (4) the defendant helped to commit the crime; and (5) the
defendant intended to help commit the crime.  Accordingly, Reed’s argument that her
guilty plea lacked a factual basis is unpersuasive.
III.
Throughout her brief Reed alleges various acts of misfeasance by her prior counsel
that are tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel.  We will not consider this
argument on direct appeal as the record is insufficient to allow disposition of Reed’s
ineffective assistance of counsel argument at this time.  See United States v. Headley, 923
F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  Reed remains free to raise this argument via petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV.
Reed also claims for the first time on appeal that the District Court lacked venue
because her crimes were committed in Pennsylvania, not Delaware.  Even if Reed’s venue
6argument had a valid basis in fact—which is dubious at best because Reed admitted in her
plea agreement that her conduct occurred “in the District of Delaware and
elsewhere”—we find that Reed’s argument fails as a matter of law because she waived
any venue objection that she might have asserted.  To be timely, a defendant must object
to venue prior to a guilty verdict, or in this case, prior to the entry of a valid guilty plea. 
United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1999).
V.
In sum, Reed has not shown that the District Court committed any error, let alone
plain error.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
